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Abstract
Whether and to what extent corruption drives emigration has received growing attention in 
the literature in recent years, yet the nature of the relationship remains unclear. To test causal 
claims, we rely on representative global survey data of more than 280,000 respondents across 
67 countries from 2010 to 2014. We use two different measures of emigration intentions and 
individual, as well as country-level measures of corruption, and propose to instrument the 
endogenous presence of corruption in a country with the prevalence of cashless transactions in 
the economy to correct for potential estimation bias. We find robust support for the hypothesis 
that corruption increases emigration intentions across countries. The effect, however, is likely 
to be underestimated in conventional models that do not account for endogeneity. The results 
highlight the need to look beyond purely economic, social, security-related, and environmental 
drivers when assessing the root causes of migration.
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1 Introduction
In the introduction to the 2004 UN Convention against Corruption, then Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan called corruption as “an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects 
on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, 
distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other 
threats to human security to flourish” (UNODC, 2004). This study analyzes whether emi-
gration should be added to the list of adverse corruption effects. We investigate whether the 
prevalence of corruption in a country affects an individual’s intentions to emigrate. In times 
of increasing migratory behavior, understanding the role of political drivers in countries of 
 origin—such as corruption—concerning commonly studied drivers, such as economic differ-
ences and social networks, is crucial. Previous studies have found that corruption is associ-
ated with higher levels of emigration (e.g., Dimant et al., 2013; Lapshyna, 2014; Poprawe, 2015; 
Cooray and Schneider, 2016). We aim to put forward available evidence by addressing three 
limitations of the emerging literature on the link between corruption and emigration.
First, most studies use migration rates or flows as the dependent variables (Dimant et al., 
2013; Poprawe, 2015; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). Observable migration, however, may be an 
imperfect measure. The flows that are officially recorded in harmonized international migra-
tion statistics do not reflect those that aspire to migration but cannot (for various) reasons 
and those that do migrate but may not appear in official statistics (Carling, 2002; Carling and 
Schewel, 2018). In this article, we instead study emigration intentions by relying on two items, 
the first measuring aspirations, the second measuring the expression of concrete plans to emi-
grate. Focusing on intentions allows us to focus on the effect of corruption at the first step of 
the migration process—the decision to migrate.
Second, the most existing comparative studies largely base their inference on aggregated, 
country-level information. Therefore, the mechanisms operating at the individual level remain 
unclear. Our analyses cover microlevel survey data of more than 280,000 respondents across 
67 countries from 2010 to 2014 (Gallup World Poll). This data allow us not only to include two 
country-level composite measures of corruption (V-Dem, Global Governance Indicators) but 
also to introduce microlevel measures of perceptions and beliefs. Furthermore, our data allow 
us to control for a wide array of alternative individual push factors.
Finally, we aim to provide insights on the causal nature of the link between corruption 
and emigration to strengthen the key assumption underlying this growing field of research. 
Given the limited data that so far has been available to researchers, most existing studies have 
been correlational. We propose to instrument the endogenous presence of corruption in a given 
country with the importance of cashless transactions in the economy. Our 2SLS model adds a 
more robust test of the effect of corruption on emigration aspirations to the existing literature.
Our results support claims that corruption causally drives emigration aspirations. This 
relationship remains robust against different operationalization, measurements, and alterna-
tive model specifications. The average estimated effect of corruption is sizable, suggesting that 
reducing corruption in the world’s most corrupt countries could shape future migration. The 
findings also suggest that conventional migration models may underestimate the impact of 
corruption when estimation bias is not addressed.
In terms of policy implications, our findings bear the relevance for policymakers in the 
field of international cooperation on development and migration. Migration has become an 
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important topic linked to international negotiations on trade and development aid. The recent 
introduction of positive and negative conditionalities, for instance regarding cooperation 
between the EU and African countries in the field of migration, represents a relevant example. 
The EU engages partner countries on curbing irregular migration and facilitating readmission 
in return for development aid and trade liberalizations. Yet, governments at the negotiation 
table may themselves be contributing to out-migration by failing to curb corruption (Concord, 
2018; Conte, 2018; D’Humières, 2018). Rather than trade liberalizations and aid, in the light of 
our findings, the fight against corruption may itself be a relevant condition for international 
cooperation.
2 The corruption-migration relationship
Corruption is commonly defined as the abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain (NORAD, 
2009). This abuse of authority may occur in different forms, such as bribery, embezzlement, 
fraud, extortion, or favoritism (ibid.). While it has been argued that corruption may be endemic 
to any kind of organized human communal life (Nye, 1967), there is a large variation in its 
prevalence and the forms it takes across countries (World Bank, 2018a). General agreement 
exists that while corruption may be individually beneficial in the short term, in the long run, 
corruption has destabilizing effects on society and development. If and how corruption influ-
ences migration is subject to a growing body of research, situated in the larger and longstand-
ing literature on so-called push-and-pull factors (Lee, 1966; Black et al., 2011; Carling and 
Talleraas, 2016; Arango, 2017).
The most important push factors include the economic situation of a country or region 
(income differentials, inequality, and poverty), insecurity and conflict (including ethnic con-
flict and gang violence), and environmental degradation. Colonial ties, family relations, and 
economic opportunities, on the other hand, are important pull forces (Ashby, 2010; Nejad and 
Young, 2010; Warner et al., 2010; Black et al., 2011; Castles et al., 2014; Carling and  Talleraas, 
2016; Arango, 2017). Reports by field practitioners and qualitative research, however, sup-
port the assertion that the aforementioned factors cannot fully explain migration flows (e.g., 
 Danziger, 2018). In response, scholars have recently steered attention toward political factors, 
such as political freedom or governance, as potential migration drivers (Wheatland, 2015; 
Merkle et al., 2017).
Carling (2002) and Carling and Schewel (2018) further refine the push-and-pull model 
by proposing an “aspiration/ability model.” This model differentiates between two separate 
components: the evaluation of migration as a potential course of action (“aspiration”) and 
the potential to realize mobility at a given moment (“ability”). Both aspirations and ability 
are functions of micro and macro-level factors on the personal, sociocultural, or economic 
level, and both components may be affected by the immigration drivers listed earlier. In other 
words, given structural and individual resources and opportunities, among those who aspire 
to migrate, only some have the ability to do so, which then manifests in their actual, observable 
migration.
Corruption is likely to affect aspirations and ability, albeit mechanisms may differ 
between the two. With regard to ability, previous studies have found that corruption may help 
circumventing legal obstacles to both voluntary or involuntary migration. For instance, Ivlevs 
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and King (2017) argue that widespread corruption among government immigration officials or 
border guards—both in origin and destination countries—may increase the ability to migrate 
because the possibility to bribe officials can open otherwise closed doors. With regard to forced 
migration, Skrivankova et al. (2011) emphasize that corruption facilitates human trafficking. 
Their findings are supported by several studies stressing that organized crime benefits substan-
tially from corrupted institutions (e.g., Richards, 2004; Carling, 2006; Bales, 2011; Rusev, 2013; 
Shelley, 2014).
Corruption is also likely to affect emigration aspirations in several ways. Corruption ham-
pers economic growth, efficiency, and investment (Mauro, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005),1 and 
economic deprivation is known to fuel emigration aspirations. Cooray and Dzhumashev (2018) 
show that emigration may also be related to the negative effect of corruption on the labor mar-
ket such as the reduction in labor force participation rates, increases in tax burden and the 
shadow economy. By increasing the level of economic uncertainty, corruption may also create 
incentives for the residents to leave for other countries where the level of uncertainty is lower 
(Dzhumashev, 2016).
Corruption also lowers returns on education, as educational attainment alone does not 
necessarily suffice anymore to secure a job or a contract (Dimant et al., 2013). Lower returns on 
education, in turn, are also known to drive emigration desires (Ariu and Squicciarini, 2013). 
Finally, in corrupt countries, the allocation of resources within a state is likely to shift. Mauro 
(1995) argues that corrupt politicians spend more public means in sectors that allow for secretly 
levying large bribes. Accordingly, social policies, like education, will receive less financial sup-
port, while other sectors, like defense, will thrive.
Taken together, these mediating factors, such as poor economic performance, lower returns 
to education, a lack of public investment, and impaired institutions, are widely acknowledged 
to stimulate emigration (Lee, 1966; Rowlands, 1999; Black et al., 2011; Carling and Talleraas, 
2016; Arango, 2017). The prevalence of emigration aspirations is, therefore, likely to increase 
in corrupt societies due to the detrimental effects corruption has on general economic and 
societal circumstances.
Corruption may, however, also stimulate emigration aspirations through another chan-
nel. Apart from a marginal fraction of a society that benefits from a corrupt and dysfunctional 
system, the majority experiences corruption as obstructive and costly. This idea is supported by 
case studies that suggest corruption is often perceived to hinder personal and professional free-
dom and development (Mullan, 2006; Malaj and de Rubertis, 2017; Kalachev, 2018; Traikova 
et al., 2018) and, therefore, causes frustration with what is seen to be an unfair system ( Clausen 
et al., 2011). This erodes an individual’s beliefs in meritocracy and with that the belief in social 
and/or economic mobility in the future. In its essence, corruption depletes individual optimism 
and the belief that merit is adequately rewarded and, as a consequence, spurs an  individual’s 
desire for change, potentially through emigration.
In sum, corruption may positively affect both emigration aspirations and ability through 
several different mechanisms. Results of existing empirical studies support this assumption 
(Dimant et al., 2013; Lapshyna, 2014; Poprawe, 2015; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). Building 
on this literature, we aim to address some of the pending limitations in this emerging field. 
1 Note that some authors find that corruption may also have positive side effects, for instance, Méon and Weill (2010) and 
Dreher and Gassebner (2013).
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Previous studies have predominantly analyzed how corruption affects international migration 
flows (see e.g., Dimant et al., 2013; Poprawe, 2015; Cooray and Schneider, 20162). Aggregate 
flows, however, capture only those people who can realize their desire to emigrate. By defini-
tion, the number of people who wish to leave always exceeds those who possess the necessary 
resources or ability to do so (Tjaden et al., 2018). Analyzing actual migration flows, thus, likely 
underestimates the influence of corruption on the desire to emigrate across the whole popula-
tion (Docquier et al., 2014). Analyzing aspirations separately allows for assessing how contex-
tual factors incite the willingness to leave, independent of the ability to act upon that desire. 
Analyzing aspirations also captures those individuals who may only be able to realize their 
aspiration using irregular paths of entry. This is even more relevant because a sizable share of 
(regional) migration is irregular, which is not accounted for in official migration statistics.
In addition to the conceptual issues of disentangling aspirations and ability, other issues 
need to be addressed. Studies on the corruption–migration relationship covering multi-
ple countries base their inference on aggregated country-level information (e.g., Lapshyna, 
2014; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). Therefore, the mechanisms operating at the individual 
level remain a black box. Those studies that take individual experiences and perceptions into 
account are often based on single-country or small-N case studies (e.g., Mullan, 2006; Malaj 
and de Rubertis, 2017; Traikova et al., 2018; Kalachev, 2018).
Finally, most research so far has been limited to correlational analyses (e.g., Carling et al., 
2015; Poprawe, 2015). Even when additional, intervening drivers are taken into account, the 
endogenous presence of corruption in a country is likely to bias estimates. Yet, clarity about the 
causal nature of the corruption-emigration nexus is crucial to allow for further developments 
in this line of research.
The following analysis aims to contribute to the study of the migration-corruption nexus 
by strengthening assumed, but largely untested, causal claims and by considering both indi-
vidual and country-level mechanisms. Our findings bear the relevance for policymakers in the 
field of international relations where migration is becoming an increasingly important piece in 
government negotiations on trade and development aid.
3 Data and identification
We use representative, repeated cross-sectional data covering 67 countries3 from 2010 to 2014 
provided by the Gallup World Poll (GWP, 2015). We test the effect of corruption on emigra-
tion intentions by combining micro-level information for more than 280,000 individuals with 
 macro-level country characteristics and two instruments to account for endogenous corrup-
tion prevalence.
We use the term intention as an umbrella term. Individual-level emigration intentions Y 
are in fact captured using two different survey items. The first is a measure of aspiration4: “Ide-
ally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or 
2 A notable exception is Lapshyna 2014, who’s analyses are however confined to the Ukraine. 
3 As emphasized by Foadi (2006), corruption as a push-factor for migration is not necessarily bound to developing 
countries, but can also influence emigration from developed countries. Accordingly, we include all countries surveyed 
by Gallup with respective questions on emigration aspirations and available corruption information.
4 According to Carling and Schewel (2018) the term migration ‘aspirations’ is interchangeable with migration ‘wishes’ or 
‘desires’.
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would you prefer to continue living in this country?” The second measure refers to a concrete 
plan and time frame: “Are you planning to move permanently to another country in the next 
12 months, or not?” We argue that the second measure captures not only aspiration but, to an 
extent, also ability based on the assumption that those individuals who perceive themselves to 
be able to realize a move are more likely to state having a concrete plan in a specific time frame. 
Neither measure captures whether or not the aspiration to leave materializes. As argued earlier, 
independent of a person leaving, we test whether corruption affects the intention to do so in 
the first place.
To measure corruption, we implement a two-tiered approach. In most existing studies, 
corruption is measured by external assessments (e.g., Dimant et al., 2013) or hybrid indices 
that combine expert opinions with survey data to estimate a country’s level of corruption (e.g., 
Ahmad, 2001; Ahmad and Arjumad, 2016). We follow this approach and include measures of 
corruption at the country-level. We use Coppedge et al.’s (2018) V-Dem 8 index for regime cor-
ruption, which is constructed from V-Dem’s measures for executive embezzlement, executive 
bribes, legislative corruption, and judicial corruption. This continuous index ranges from 0 to 1, 
with higher values indicating higher levels of regime corruption. As a check for measurement 
robustness, we estimated all models with the inverse of the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators’ assessment of corruption control in a given year (World Bank, 2018a rescaled from 
0 to 1; e.g., Svensson, 2005) and Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) (Transparency International, 2018). All estimations are robust with regard to the coun-
try-level measure used. In the text, we report the results using the V-Dem indicator. The results 
for WGI and CPI are found in Appendices C and D.
Alongside country-level measures of corruption, we add individual perception measures. 
Although country-level measures undeniably provide highly valuable and comparative infor-
mation on the prevalence of corruption at the country level, within the same country, there are 
differences between individuals with regard to the degree they encounter or perceive corrup-
tion (e.g., Treisman, 2007).5 Importantly, we argue that both the individual perception of cor-
ruption and country-level prevalence affect the desire to leave. The individual-level perception 
variables function as a proxy for direct exposure to corruption (having to bribe someone or wit-
ness incidents). They are measured using the following binary items: “Is corruption widespread 
throughout the government in this country, or not?” and “Is corruption widespread within 
businesses located in this country, or not?” (1 if either government or business is perceived to 
be corrupt). To our knowledge, GWP data is the only source for individual perceptions with 
comprehensive country coverage (cf. Merkle et al., 2017).6 We always include the country-level 
corruption measures alongside the individual-level measures, to ensure that corruption per-
ception is compared across individuals that are situated in similar contexts.
To further approximate the effect of corruption on emigration intentions at the individual 
level, we introduce a dummy for agreement with the statement that hard work brings success: 
“Can people get ahead in this country by working hard or not?” The logic behind including this 
5 Empirically, the V-Dem indicator for corruption is moderately positively correlated with the 6-year average share of 
respondents who believe their country to be corrupt (correlation coefficient = 0.538).
6 The GWP includes a number of other measures of corruption, among them “Was there at least one instance in the last 
12 months when you had to give a bribe or present, or not?” which is a more direct measure of exposure to corruption. 
However, all of the other corruption measures were unfortunately only asked for a limited number of countries and 
years, thus now allowing for larger scale comparative analyses. 
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as a proxy for corruption experience is that exposure to corruption decreases returns on educa-
tion, hinders promotions at the workplace, and imposes constraints on individual efforts (e.g. 
Dimant et al., 2013). We expect that people who are affected by corrupt practices in some way 
or the other are less likely to agree with the statement that hard work pays off. At the country 
level, the share of people disagreeing with ‘hard work pays off’ is positively correlated with the 
country’s V-Dem level of corruption (see Figure A1 in Appendix).
Subsequently, we add several individual-level controls X'j , including standard socio- 
economic characteristics, as specified in previous studies (e.g., Castles et al., 2014; Poprawe, 
2015): gender, age, educational attainment (three-level), whether the person is single (unmar-
ried) and if they have minor children. The corresponding summary statistics can be found 
in Table A1 in Appendix. We further control for the respondent’s urban or rural area of resi-
dence and proxy economic wellbeing with household income (population quintiles). As a key 
potential pull factor of migration, GWP allows for the consideration of individual connections 
abroad by accounting for having relatives or “someone who I can rely on” living in another 
country. We also control for a country-level index measuring political stability and the absence 
of violence and terrorism (World Bank, 2018a; see also Dimant et al., 2013),7 and whether 
the country was involved in an armed conflict with more than 25 battle-related deaths in a 
given year based on the UCDP/PRIO (2018) armed conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). As 
a more general measure of stability, institutional quality and personal freedom, we further 
introduce the Cato institute’s Human Freedom Index (Vásquez and Porčnik, 2019). As stressed 
for instance by Merkle et al. (2017), controlling for regime aspects is important because high 
levels of corruption weaken institutions, which in turn is often associated with unstable and 
undemocratic regimes. Furthermore, we include controls for the log GDP per capita in 2010 
USD, income inequality by the country’s GINI index, and financial development to account 
for economic development. A full list of sampled countries as well as their respondents’ mean 
levels of emigration desires and plans is shown in Table A2 in Appendix.
We do not include destination country characteristics in our model, although destination 
characteristics and a proxy for the cost of migration play an important role in gravity models 
estimating actual migration flows (e.g., Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Ortega and Peri, 2013). As 
we analyze emigration intentions, however, our sample includes individuals who do not state 
any desire to leave and thus, also do not have a preferred destination. Furthermore, among 
those expressing a desire to leave, not everybody has a clear notion of their preferred destina-
tion. Finally, assessments of preferred destinations would be biased by subjective beliefs and 
incomplete information (for instance regarding employment regulation at the destination, or 
opportunities in general). Therefore, we define our emigration model as
X'Y C B uˆjit j it jit it jitβ τ ϕ δ ε= + + + +  (1)
where the individual probability of expressing emigration intentions Yj in country i at time 
t is a function of a set of individual socioeconomic characteristics X'j , the country’s level of 
corruption Cit at time t, the individual belief regarding the level of corruption in the coun-
try B̂jit at time t, additional country characteristics uit, and an error term. However, ordinary 
7 WGI-polstab measures the perception of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, 
including terrorism.
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least squares will produce misleading results if corruption is correlated with the error term. 
This might be the case for many reasons: Apart from the fundamental concern of omitting 
variables that simultaneously affect emigration aspirations and corruption, causality may run 
from emigration aspirations to corruption and not vice versa. This concern would, in fact, be 
more pronounced if we were to analyze actual migration flows, for instance. Abdih et al. (2012) 
find that migrant remittances increase corruption in their origin countries. There is also some 
evidence that causality could run from emigration intentions to corruption as a rent-seeking 
practice, as highlighted by Mariani (2007).
To approach these endogeneity concerns, we follow an instrumental variable approach as 
has been widely adopted in migration research (e.g., Altonji and Card, 1991; for an overview 
see also Jaeger et al., 2018). Cooray and Schneider (2016) have recently estimated the effect 
of corruption on aggregated migration flows into 20 OECD countries with the geographical 
distance to the equator of the country of origin as an instrument. We argue that the effect 
of corruption on emigration, when corruption is instrumented by latitude, is biased by other 
channels through which latitude may be correlated with the error term.8 Hence, we propose the 
importance of cashless payment systems in the economy as an alternative measure. In addi-
tion, we instrument corruption with the level of corruption in 1950 (initial corruption), as has 
been done, for instance, by Gupta et al. (2002) and Cooray and Schneider (2016).
The identifying assumption is that a nation’s reliance on cashless payment negatively 
affects (money-related) corruption because paper-trails render bribery more difficult (e.g. 
Tanzi, 1998). Vice versa, an economy that relies more heavily on cash transfers offers more 
opportunities for (financial) corruption. Payments can be hidden, and documentation is more 
difficult to track compared to electronic payments. Ayoola (2014) demonstrates this relation-
ship using the example of Nigeria where a cashless policy was recently initiated to curb cor-
ruption (see also Mieseigha and Ogbodo, 2013). Similarly, the government of India banned the 
vast majority of the nation’s banknotes with the stated goals of fighting corruption (Shendge et 
al. 2017; Pal et al., 2018).
On the other hand, whether cash or electronic payments prevail in a country of origin is 
arguably not a decisive factor for migration aspirations. However, it is conceivable that there 
may be an indirect effect of the instrument on the dependent variable running through eco-
nomic performance (e.g., Altunbas and Thornton, 2011; Gupta et al., 2009; Huang 2010). We 
thus include controls on financial and economic development. The adoption of cheque, card, 
and electronic money in several European Union countries between 2000 and 2012 has led to 
(moderate) economic growth in the long run (Tee and Ong, 2016). Positive short-run effects 
have also been observed in the wake of a more recent major policy shift towards a cashless econ-
omy in Nigeria (Mieseigha and Ogbodo, 2013). As was argued earlier, economic development 
is an important driver of migration. Hence, in our 2SLS model, we account for the potentially 
confounding channel of cashless payments on migration through economic performance by 
controlling for GDP per capita (log). Furthermore, cashless payments could also be positively 
related to financial development, which has been shown to facilitate migration (e.g., Rozelle et 
8 Geographical distance measures have experienced extensive use as explanation for various outcomes. For instance, La 
Porta et al. (1999) show that the quality of government increases with increasing distance from the equator. Sachs (2001), 
in turn, links economic development to climatic zones and Gupta et al. (2002) use latitude and level of democracy to 
instrument the effect of corruption on income inequality and poverty. Arguably, corruption is related to all of the above, 
that is, government performance, economic development, income inequality, and poverty.
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al., 1999). We thus include the International Monetary Fund’s index of financial development 
in our estimations (IMF, 2018).
We utilize information on the importance of cashless payment systems from the World 
Bank’s Global Payment Systems Survey (GPSS) (World Bank, 2018b). To minimize biased esti-
mates resulting from measurement errors, we introduce two different instruments that follow 
the same logic but capture different dimensions of the cashless economy: first, we introduce 
the number of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita (IV-accounts) as a baseline. The num-
ber of accounts each resident holds on average can be regarded as a proxy of how widespread 
cashless transfers are in a country. Hence, the IV-accounts can be regarded as the underlying 
capability of a population to use electronic payment systems. As an alternative, we measure the 
value of cashless payments relative to the Gross Domestic Product in a given year (IV-value). 
This share shall denote the importance of the cashless sector in a given country reflected in 
monetary terms.
Accordingly, we argue that payment modalities together with initial corruption address 
the potential endogeneity/measurement error in the country’s corruption level by instrument-
ing Cst such that
XY C B uˆ ˆjit j it jit it jit' β τ ϕ δ ε= + + + +  (2)
where  Ĉit indicates the predicted values from the first stage regression
X'C IV ujit j it it jitβ τ δ ε= + + +  (3)
The proposed instruments pass all established tests for validity and strength, as we will 
demonstrate in section 4 below.9
4 Empirical results
A first look at the bivariate relationship between corruption levels and levels of emigration 
aspirations at the country level supports previous findings. Figure 1 shows the descriptive 
relationship between a country’s level of corruption (V-DEM) and the share of residents with 
emigration aspirations (both measured at the 5-year country average 2010–2014). The overall 
relationship is positive, with countries ranking lowest on the corruption scale, such as Austra-
lia or Sweden, having emigration aspiration rates below 20% of the representative sample, while 
in more corrupt countries—despite larger variation—up to 50% of the sample shows a desire 
to leave the country.
In Table 1, we present the estimated corruption coefficients for emigration aspirations. 
We follow a stepwise logic of assessing the robustness of the corruption effect.10 Model 1 
includes only the country-level covariates, whereas Model 2 adds individual-level controls. 
This increases the explained variance, indicating that in line with existing literature, individual 
characteristics are highly relevant for emigration aspirations. Including these individual-level 
9 Note that information on cashless payment is not fully available. However, there is no systematic pattern regarding 
which country has available information on cashless payment. Moreover, OLS estimates do not change decisively if the 
sample is not restricted to available cashless payment information.
10 Reported standard errors are clustered at the country-year level, since we have repeated-cross sections, that is, individual 
observations within a country are independent from each other.
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controls, however, does not change the coefficient size for country-level corruption. Adding 
the two individual corruption perception measures in Model 3, however, decreases the effect 
of country-level corruption. Both individual perception of corruption and the disbelief that 
hard work pays off are significantly related to emigration aspirations, indicating that personal 
beliefs and experience play a role in explaining how corruption affects emigration aspirations. 
Higher perception of corruption increases the desire to emigrate, whereas the belief that hard 
work pays off decreases that desire.
Our main 2SLS specifications are presented in Models 4 and 5, where we instrument cor-
ruption in a current year with IV accounts (Model 4) and IV value/GDP (Model 5), together with 
initial corruption. The full regression results can be found in Table B1 in Appendix. The results 
of the IV regression show an effect of corruption on emigration aspirations of approximately 
the size of the OLS estimates when using the value of cashless payments as an instrument. The 
effect is twice as high than the OLS estimates, however, when instrumenting endogenous cor-
ruption with the number of cashless accounts (Model 4). This seems to support the endogeneity 
assumption: (adjusted) OLS underestimates the effect of corruption on emigration because of 
potentially unmeasured confounders (e.g., Hogan and Lancaster, 2004). Table 1 further reports 
a series of tests for the instruments’ validity and strength (cf. Baum et al., 2007). The statisti-
cally significant first stage coefficients indicate that both measures of a cashless economy as 
well as corruption in 1950 are associated with a lower (for corruption in 1950: higher) level of 
corruption in the country. All instruments also stand the tests for identifying restrictions.
The country-level measure of corruption is a decisive push-factor for emigration aspira-
tions across all specifications. All other covariates have effects in the expected direction (see 
Table B1 in Appendix). Adding the perception proxy to the model, that is, whether the respon-
dent thinks that the government and/or businesses are corrupt, ensures that the coefficient of 
Figure 1 Relationship of corruption and share of people with migration aspirations.
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the country-level measure is not distorted by variation in individual exposure to corruption. 
Moreover, keeping the overall corruption level in a country at the mean, perceiving the govern-
ment to be corrupt has a significant effect in both 2SLS models. Similarly, individual disagree-
ment with the statement that hard work is rewarded—a fact that is more likely to be given in 
more corrupt countries—consistently increases emigration intentions. Hence, the results indi-
cate that emigration desire is driven by both, country-level prevalence and individual beliefs 
about or experiences of corruption.
The estimated 2SLS coefficient for cashless accounts amounts to 0.370 and 0.167 for 
the value of cashless payments, respectively, for a change in corruption level from 0 to 1. 
To illustrate the effect sizes, let us assume that normalized values from 0 to 1 describe the 
percentage of corruption in a country: If the corruption level in (a counterfactual) Nigeria 
would decrease by 50 percentage points (from 90 to 40%, approximately the corruption level 
Table 1 Effect of level of corruption on emigration aspirations
OLS IV
Accountsb Value/GDPc
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruptiona 0.162*** (0.038) 0.167*** (0.036) 0.143*** (0.035) 0.370** (0.164) 0.167* (0.093)
Corruption perception 0.056*** (0.004) 0.050*** (0.005) 0.056*** (0.005)
Disagree: hard work 
pays off
0.067*** (0.005) 0.062*** (0.007) 0.067*** (0.006)
Individual covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.086 0.095 0.087 0.095
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
First stage
Accounts/value −0.012* (0.007) −0.037*** (0.008)
Level of corruption 1950a 0.146*** (0.048) 0.196*** (0.045)
Weak identification 
Kleibergen-Paap F 
statistic
9.220 30.326
Under-identifying  
restrictions
Kleibergen-Paap LM 
stat.
5.361 26.680
Endog. regressors joint 
sig.
Anderson-Rubin  
F statistic 2.164 2.055
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level.
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
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of South Africa), the predicted share of individuals with emigration desires would fall by up 
to one quarter, from 46% to a share between 27 and 37% of the adult population. In contrast, 
should Germany—ceteris paribus—experience a drastic deterioration in its corruption level 
from 2% to South Africa’s current level (37%), we would expect the share of the adult popula-
tion with a desire to emigrate to jump from 16 to level between 22 and 29%.
Moving from aspirations to a model that also incorporates the ability to some extent, 
we report the estimated corruption coefficients for plans to emigrate in the next 12 months in 
Table 2 (see Appendix B2 for full regression table). Estimating the effect on corruption on con-
crete emigration intentions serves as a robustness check, but also allows us to draw some con-
clusions with regard to the aspiration-ability nexus. Table 2 shows that the size of the coefficient 
decreases for all the corruption measures. Corruption thus seems to have a stronger influence 
on aspiration than on concrete plans. The explained variance decreases substantially, too. This 
Table 2 Effect of level of corruption on plans to emigrate in the next 12 months
OLS IV
Accountsb Value/GDPc
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruptiona 0.020** (0.009) 0.019** (0.008) 0.016** (0.008) 0.105** (0.041) 0.050** (0.020)
Corruption perception 0.006*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001)
Disagree: hard work  
pays off
0.008*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.001)
Individual covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.023 0.025 0.018 0.022
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
First stage
Accounts/value −0.012* (0.007) −0.037*** (0.008)
Level of corruption 1950a    0.146*** (0.048) 0.196*** (0.045)
Weak identification      
Kleibergen-Paap F  
statistic
   9.220 30.326
Under-identifying  
restrictions
     
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat.    5.361 26.680
Endog. regressors joint 
sig.
     
Anderson-Rubin  
F statistic    
5.789 5.408
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level.
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
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could be interpreted as evidence that ability is not affected by corruption to the same degree as 
aspiration, i.e. that corruption increases dissatisfaction, but does not necessarily enable emi-
gration. This result, however, warrants further analyses.
To test the stability of our results, we perform a series of robustness checks. First, we re- 
estimate all models using different measures of country-level corruption. Appendix C shows 
the full 2SLS results when replacing V-Dem corruption with the inverse of “control of cor-
ruption” from the World Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank, 2018a; see Table C1 in 
 Appendix for desire and Table C2 in Appendix for intentions). Except for the fact that (endog-
enous) corruption renders statistically insignificant results in the full OLS-model (3), all other 
coefficients remain stable. We also perform the analyses using the Corruption Perception Index 
on the country-level (Transparency International, 2018). Note that CPI and WGI depict a very 
strong correlation. Hence, the coefficients are again robust to this alternative specification as 
shown in Tables D1 and D2 in Appendix.
Last, we perform several sub-sample analyses presented in Table E1 in Appendix. The 
effect runs in the same direction across all sub-samples, that is, higher endogenous corruption 
is associated with higher emigration desire/intentions when instrumented with cashless pay-
ment systems. However, based on effect sizes and their robustness, it seems that the corruption- 
emigration relationship is mainly driven by poorer and economically unequal countries 
(Models 3,4 and 7,8). This could be driven by the fact that corruption and therewith its det-
rimental impact is more prevalent among poorer and unequal countries. Interestingly, the 
effect is stronger across more politically stable countries (Models 9,10), which one could 
explain with generally high emigration aspirations across countries stricken by conflict and 
instability. In other words, the absence of economic opportunities and the perception of 
unfair returns may by superimposed by more substantial threats to live and belongings as an 
emigration driver.
Overall, our results support claims of a causal relationship between corruption and emigra-
tion intentions. We demonstrate that the corruption effect stands the test of quasi-experimental 
approaches using a set of innovative instruments with the number of accounts capable of cash-
less payments and the value of cashless payments relative to the country’s GDP. We argue that 
both instruments are meaningful and report a series of successful testing of their power and 
validity. We can show that models without correction for endogeneity are likely to underesti-
mate the effect. In sum, the prevalence of corruption in a country induces emigration intentions, 
which—on average—are associated with increased migration flows (e.g., Tjaden et al., 2018).
5 Conclusions
The necessity to account for politics and institutions in origin countries when trying to explain 
emigration has been pointed out by many researchers (e.g., Wheatland, 2015; Merkle et al., 
2017). Among the political drivers that have been examined, corruption is increasingly gaining 
attention. Our results show a sizable effect of corruption on two different measures of emi-
gration intention that is robust against a comprehensive range of individual-level and coun-
try-level controls and includes careful consideration of alternative drivers such as poverty, 
conflict, and social ties, among others. The 2SLS results based on global micro-level data con-
firm previous findings (Dimant et al., 2013; Lapshyna, 2014; Carling et al., 2015; Poprawe, 2015; 
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Cooray and Schneider, 2016) and generate confidence that the individual probability of wish-
ing and planning to emigrate is causally related to the prevalence of corruption in the country. 
The results also show that the corruption effect is likely to be underestimated when endogene-
ity is not addressed appropriately.
Providing reliable evidence on the link between corruption and emigration is a crucial 
step forward for the academic study of migration. The results provide researchers with more 
confidence that corruption effects are not statistical artifacts and deserve further exploration. 
Corruption indices may also be a useful addition to general migration models aiming at pre-
dicting flows or investigating other migration drivers.
Understanding the relationship between corruption and emigration is also important for 
policymakers in countries of origin and countries of destination alike. From the destination 
countries’ perspective, EU policy-makers, for instance, have stressed the need to address “root 
causes” of irregular migration in light of increased immigration in recent decades (European 
Commission, 2018). In addition, there is growing attention to supporting improvements in 
governance in origin countries through conditional development assistance.
However, our analysis does not come without limitations. First and foremost, our sample 
does not cover all countries. In providing empirical evidence for 67 countries across the globe, 
we reach beyond most existing research; yet, the data still represents approximately a 37% 
sample of the global population. Secondly, it has to be taken into account that our dependent 
variables—emigration desires and plans—warrant attention per se, as they are an approxima-
tion of actual migration, although we argue that both reflect a valid measure to test corruption 
effects. Additionally, recent research has shown that the correlation between intentions and 
flows is very strong (e.g., Tjaden et al., 2018). Thirdly, our ability to capture the direct effect of 
corruption is limited, as perceptions are likely to be correlated, but not necessarily identical 
with actual experiences. Under certain circumstances, such perception measures may even 
be preferable for estimating migration intentions, but inferences about the direct effect of cor-
ruption have to be drawn with care. Additionally, the definition of corruption and its measure 
is always imprecise to a certain extent. As stressed by Cheng and Zaum (2008) for the policy 
sphere, it is plausible that the GWP individual-level measure of corruption perception depicts 
a “catch-all” term, including aspects beyond a close definition, such as mismanagement or 
dysfunctional rule of law. This is also partly true for macro-level measures such as the WGI 
which—among other sources—rely on survey information when assessing a country’s level 
of corruption. However, by accounting for both measures, subjective corruption perception 
and V-DEM as an external proxy, we seek to address criticism regarding the shortcomings of 
using either measures of perceived or of actual (experienced) corruption (e.g., Treisman, 2007; 
Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014; Jahedi and Méndez, 2014).
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the field by strengthening its main 
underlying assumption, that corruption indeed triggers emigration intentions. We improve the 
robustness of OLS estimates on the effect of corruption on emigration aspirations by means of 
an improved 2SLS identification to draw causal inferences. Moreover, by systematically com-
bining individual- with country-level assessments of corruption and by estimating the effect 
on two different layers of emigration intentions (aspirations vs. plans), we are able to further 
investigate the mechanism at play. Overall, corruption deserves more scholarly and policy 
attention as an important push factor of migration.
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Appendix
A Descriptive and bivariate statistics
Figure A1  Relationship between corruption perception and notion that hard work is 
rewarded.
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Table A1 Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max Source Definition
Emigration desire 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 GWP “Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you 
like to move permanently to another country, 
or would you prefer to continue living in this 
country?”
Emigration plans 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 GWP “Are you planning to move permanently to 
 another country in the next 12 months, or not?”
Level of corruption 
(V-Dem)
0.40 0.31 0.00 1.00 V-Dem Index of regime corruption (executive embez-
zlement, executive bribes, legislative corrup-
tion, and judicial corruption)
Initial corruption 
(1950, V-Dem)
0.37 0.27 0.00 1.00 V-Dem Corruption index from the year 1950.
Inverse of corrup-
tion control WGI
0.51 0.25 0.00 1.00 WB Inverse of the World Bank  Governance Indica-
tor’s assessment of corruption control.
Inverse of corrup-
tion control CPI
0.52 0.23 0.00 1.00 TI Index of perceived level of public sector 
 corruption.
Corruption 
 perception
0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 GWP “Is corruption widespread throughout the 
government in this country, or not?” and “Is 
corruption widespread within businesses 
located in this country, or not?”
Disagree with “Work 
hard, get ahead”
0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 GWP “Can people get ahead in this country by 
working hard or not?”
Female 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 GWP Gender
(Continued)
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Mean SD Min Max Source Definition
Age 43.68 17.81 15.00 99.00 GWP Age in years
Lower education 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 GWP Three-level educational attainment measure.
Medium education 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 GWP Three-level educational attainment measure.
Higher education 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 GWP Three-level educational attainment measure.
Single 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 GWP Person is unmarried.
No children 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 GWP Person does not have minor children.
Urban location 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 GWP Urban area of residence.
Income: Poorest 
20% of the country
0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 GWP Household income per population quintile.
Income: Second 20% 
of the country
0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 GWP Household income per population quintile.
Income: Middle 20% 
of the country
0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 GWP Household income per population quintile.
Income: Fourth 20% 
of the country
0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 GWP Household income per population quintile.
Income: Richest 20% 
of the country
0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 GWP Household income per population quintile.
Know family/friends 
abroad
0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 GWP “Do you have relatives or someone whom you 
can rely on living in another country?”
Political Stability 0.03 0.90 −2.80 1.00 WB Index of perceptions of the likelihood of po-
litical instability and/or politically-motivated 
violence, including terrorism
Human Freedom 
Index
7.40 0.92 5.1 9 Cato Index of personal, civil, and economic free-
dom. Human freedom, understood as the 
absence of coercive constraint.
Conflict (>25 BRD) 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 UCDP Was the country involved in an armed conflict 
with more than 25 battle-related deaths in a 
given year?
GDP per capita (log) 9.69 0.89 6.50 11.00 WB GDP per capita.
Gini index 0.47 0.09 0.30 1.00 GWP GINI coefficient calculated from GWP house-
hold income per capita.
Financial  
development
0.45 0.23 0.10 1.00 WB Index (financial depth, access, efficiency, 
and stability for the financial institutions and 
financial markets)
IV cashless  
accounts p.c. (log)
1.20 1.16 0.00 12.00 WB Number of cashless transactions per capita.
IV value of  
payments/GDP (log)
−0.62 1.40 −6.30 2.00 WB Value of cashless payments by GDP per capita.
Observations 282,381
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
Table A1 (Continued)
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Table A2  Country coverage 2010–2014 and share of respondents with emigration 
desire/plans
Country Desire Plans Country Desire Plans
Albania 0.444 0.045 Liberia 0.533 0.141
Angola 0.287 0.012 Lithuania 0.207 0.030
Argentina 0.129 0.007 Luxembourg 0.148 0.010
Armenia 0.409 0.055 Malaysia 0.106 0.014
Australia 0.068 0.005 Moldova 0.331 0.037
Austria 0.086 0.005 Morocco 0.271 0.021
Azerbaijan 0.168 0.012 Mozambique 0.189 0.008
Bangladesh 0.245 0.012 Netherlands 0.198 0.007
Bolivia 0.255 0.039 Nigeria 0.458 0.063
Brazil 0.108 0.006 Norway 0.149 0.007
Bulgaria 0.221 0.027 Pakistan 0.142 0.012
Chile 0.217 0.015 Peru 0.294 0.028
Colombia 0.262 0.033 Philippines 0.160 0.017
Costa Rica 0.203 0.020 Poland 0.190 0.019
Croatia 0.190 0.013 Portugal 0.236 0.020
Cyprus 0.279 0.025 Romania 0.242 0.023
Dominican Republic 0.496 0.052 Singapore 0.156 0.010
Ecuador 0.140 0.015 Slovenia 0.208 0.008
Estonia 0.225 0.025 South Africa 0.150 0.014
Ethiopia 0.328 0.040 Spain 0.150 0.020
Finland 0.109 0.009 Sri Lanka 0.154 0.010
France 0.196 0.011 Sweden 0.139 0.006
Georgia 0.150 0.009 Switzerland 0.085 0.002
Germany 0.159 0.004 Thailand 0.025 0.001
Greece 0.216 0.030 Trinidad and Tobago 0.158 0.015
Guatemala 0.302 0.043 Tunisia 0.262 0.033
Honduras 0.450 0.064 Turkey 0.119 0.008
Hungary 0.194 0.024 United Arab Emirates 0.065 0.004
Ireland 0.200 0.016 United Kingdom 0.261 0.008
Israel 0.150 0.008 United States 0.086 0.003
Jamaica 0.415 0.080 Uruguay 0.122 0.013
Japan 0.188 0.001 Vietnam 0.081 0.006
Kazakhstan 0.142 0.008 Zambia 0.270 0.028
Latvia 0.204 0.029
Source: GWP, own calculations.
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B Full regression tables
Table B1 Full regression table for emigration desire
OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Corruptiona 0.162***
(0.038)
0.167***
(0.036)
0.143***
(0.035)
0.370**
(0.164)
0.167*
(0.093)
IV: accounts and 
value
−0.012*
(0.007)
−0.037***
(0.008)
IV: corruption 1950 0.146***
(0.048)
0.196***
(0.045)
Corruption  
perception
0.056***
(0.004)
0.050***
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.007)
0.056***
(0.005)
0.016**
(0.007)
Disagree w/work 
hard,…
0.067***
(0.005)
0.062***
(0.007)
0.026***
(0.008)
0.067***
(0.006)
0.015**
(0.007)
GDP p.c. (log) −0.033**
(0.014)
−0.036**
(0.014)
−0.033**
(0.014)
−0.022
(0.018)
−0.035
(0.026)
−0.032**
(0.015)
−0.025
(0.023)
GINI 0.210***
(0.054)
0.106*
(0.054)
0.159***
(0.055)
0.160***
(0.057)
0.014
(0.106)
0.159***
(0.054)
0.134
(0.110)
Financial  
development
−0.156***
(0.038)
−0.086**
(0.037)
−0.072**
(0.036)
−0.013
(0.058)
−0.244***
(0.073)
−0.066
(0.041)
−0.144*
(0.076)
Political stability −0.016
(0.014)
−0.012
(0.014)
−0.006
(0.014)
0.007
(0.017)
−0.042*
(0.024)
−0.005
(0.014)
−0.050**
(0.024)
Conflict (>25 BRD) −0.076***
(0.026)
−0.078***
(0.027)
−0.074***
(0.026)
−0.077**
(0.030)
0.021
(0.041)
−0.074***
(0.026)
0.003
(0.042)
Human Freedom 
Index
0.090***
(0.012)
0.094***
(0.012)
0.083***
(0.011)
0.115***
(0.025)
−0.137***
(0.025)
0.086***
(0.017)
−0.144***
(0.024)
Female −0.029***
(0.003)
−0.031***
(0.003)
−0.031***
(0.003)
−0.000
(0.001)
−0.031***
(0.003)
−0.000
(0.001)
Age −0.004***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
Medium educ.  
(ref.: low)
0.012**
(0.006)
0.009
(0.006)
0.009
(0.006)
0.008
(0.007)
0.009
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.006)
High education 
(ref.: low)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.006)
0.012
(0.008)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.004
(0.007)
Single 0.044***
(0.005)
0.046***
(0.005)
0.051***
(0.007)
−0.024***
(0.006)
0.047***
(0.006)
−0.021***
(0.005)
No children 0.000
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.006*
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
Urban location 0.028***
(0.004)
0.029***
(0.004)
0.033***
(0.006)
−0.022***
(0.008)
0.029***
(0.004)
−0.015**
(0.007)
2nd inc. quint.  
(ref.: poorest)
−0.006*
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.003)
−0.006*
(0.003)
0.003
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
3rd inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.011***
(0.004)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.002)
4th inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.016***
(0.004)
−0.013***
(0.004)
−0.013***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.002)
−0.013***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.002)
(Continued)
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OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Richest inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.021***
(0.005)
−0.016***
(0.005)
−0.017***
(0.005)
0.003
(0.003)
−0.016***
(0.005)
0.004
(0.003)
Know someone 
abroad
0.091***
(0.005)
0.093***
(0.005)
0.089***
(0.006)
0.011*
(0.006)
0.092***
(0.005)
0.014**
(0.006)
Constant −0.205
(0.175)
−0.064
(0.175)
−0.083
(0.177)
−0.545
(0.366)
1.810***
(0.233)
−0.132
(0.254)
1.619***
(0.225)
Kleibergen-Paap LM 9.220 30.326
Kleibergen-Paap F 5.361 26.680
Anderson-Rubin F 2.164 2.055
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.086 0.095 0.087 0.095
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level. 
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
Table B1 (Continued)
Table B2 Full regression table for plans to emigration within the next 12 months
OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Corruptiona 0.020**
(0.009)
0.019**
(0.008)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.105**
(0.041)
0.050**
(0.020)
IV: accounts and 
value
−0.012*
(0.007)
−0.037***
(0.008)
IV: corruption 1950 0.146***
(0.048)
0.196***
(0.045)
Corruption  
perception
0.006***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.018***
(0.007)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.016**
(0.007)
Disagree w/work 
hard,…
0.008***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.026***
(0.008)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.015**
(0.007)
GDP p.c. (log) −0.009*
(0.005)
−0.010**
(0.005)
−0.010**
(0.005)
−0.006
(0.006)
−0.035
(0.026)
−0.009*
(0.005)
−0.025
(0.023)
GINI 0.034***
(0.010)
0.017
(0.010)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.023
(0.015)
0.014
(0.106)
0.023**
(0.011)
0.134
(0.110)
Financial  
development
−0.025***
(0.009)
−0.005
(0.009)
−0.003
(0.009)
0.020
(0.016)
−0.244***
(0.073)
0.005
(0.011)
−0.144*
(0.076)
Political stability −0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.006
(0.004)
−0.042*
(0.024)
0.003
(0.003)
−0.050**
(0.024)
(Continued)
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OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Conflict (>25 BRD) −0.006
(0.004)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.007
(0.006)
0.021
(0.041)
−0.006
(0.005)
0.003
(0.042)
Human Freedom 
Index
0.014***
(0.003)
0.012***
(0.003)
0.011***
(0.003)
0.023***
(0.006)
−0.137***
(0.025)
0.016***
(0.004)
−0.144***
(0.024)
Female −0.006***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
Age −0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
Medium educ.  
(ref.: low)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.008
(0.007)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.006)
High education  
(ref.: low)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.012
(0.008)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.004
(0.007)
Single 0.007***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.002)
−0.024***
(0.006)
0.008***
(0.002)
−0.021***
(0.005)
No children 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.005
(0.003)
Urban location 0.007***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.002)
−0.022***
(0.008)
0.008***
(0.001)
−0.015**
(0.007)
2nd inc. quint.  
(ref.: poorest)
−0.002*
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
−0.002**
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)
−0.002**
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
3rd inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.002)
4th inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
−0.005***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
Richest inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
Know someone 
abroad
0.030***
(0.002)
0.031***
(0.002)
0.029***
(0.002)
0.011*
(0.006)
0.030***
(0.002)
0.014**
(0.006)
Constant −0.011
(0.046)
0.025
(0.045)
0.023
(0.045)
−0.156*
(0.092)
1.810***
(0.233)
−0.045
(0.055)
1.619***
(0.225)
Kleibergen-Paap LM 9.220 30.326
Kleibergen-Paap F 5.361 26.680
Anderson-Rubin F 
statistic
5.789 5.408
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.024 0.025 0.015 0.023
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level.
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
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C Results using WGI corruption
Table C1 Full regression table for emigration desire (inverse of WGI corruption control)
OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Corruptiona 0.154***
(0.050)
0.150***
(0.048)
0.050
(0.049)
0.343**
(0.168)
0.212*
(0.110)
IV: accounts and 
value
−0.009*
(0.005)
−0.028***
(0.005)
IV: corruption 1950 0.158***
(0.024)
0.196***
(0.023)
Corruption  
perception
0.057***
(0.004)
0.043***
(0.009)
0.043***
(0.004)
0.049***
(0.007)
0.041***
(0.004)
Disagree w/work 
hard,…
0.069***
(0.006)
0.061***
(0.007)
0.030***
(0.005)
0.065***
(0.007)
0.021***
(0.004)
GDP p.c. (log) −0.038***
(0.014)
−0.040***
(0.014)
−0.039***
(0.015)
−0.032**
(0.016)
−0.010
(0.015)
−0.035**
(0.015)
−0.002
(0.014)
0.200***
(0.057)
0.097*
(0.058)
0.155***
(0.058)
0.136**
(0.063)
0.081
(0.063)
0.145**
(0.059)
0.172**
(0.067)
Financial  
development
−0.139***
(0.043)
−0.072*
(0.042)
−0.091**
(0.041)
0.022
(0.072)
−0.372***
(0.041)
−0.029
(0.054)
−0.295***
(0.041)
Political stability −0.014
(0.015)
−0.010
(0.015)
−0.011
(0.015)
0.011
(0.020)
−0.057***
(0.013)
0.001
(0.016)
−0.063***
(0.013)
Conflict (>25 BRD) −0.066**
(0.026)
−0.069***
(0.027)
−0.070***
(0.026)
−0.057*
(0.030)
−0.036
(0.024)
−0.063**
(0.028)
−0.050**
(0.025)
0.081***
(0.012)
0.084***
(0.012)
0.067***
(0.011)
0.094***
(0.017)
−0.085***
(0.012)
0.082***
(0.015)
−0.091***
(0.011)
Female −0.029***
(0.003)
−0.031***
(0.003)
−0.031***
(0.003)
0.001**
(0.001)
−0.031***
(0.003)
0.001**
(0.000)
Age −0.004***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Medium educ.  
(ref.: low)
0.012**
(0.006)
0.010
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.009
(0.006)
0.003
(0.004)
High education  
(ref.: low)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.012**
(0.005)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.006
(0.004)
Single 0.041***
(0.005)
0.043***
(0.005)
0.045***
(0.006)
−0.007*
(0.003)
0.044***
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.003)
No children 0.000
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.006*
(0.004)
0.011***
(0.002)
−0.005
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.002)
Urban location 0.026***
(0.004)
0.026***
(0.004)
0.029***
(0.005)
−0.012***
(0.004)
0.028***
(0.004)
−0.007*
(0.004)
2nd inc. quint.  
(ref.: poorest)
−0.005
(0.003)
−0.005
(0.003)
−0.005
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.005
(0.003)
0.000
(0.001)
3rd inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.011***
(0.004)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.001)
4th inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.015***
(0.004)
−0.012***
(0.004)
−0.012***
(0.004)
−0.002**
(0.001)
−0.012***
(0.004)
−0.002*
(0.001)
(Continued)
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OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Richest inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.020***
(0.005)
−0.016***
(0.005)
−0.015***
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.015***
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.002)
Know someone 
abroad
0.091***
(0.005)
0.094***
(0.005)
0.089***
(0.006)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.092***
(0.005)
0.013***
(0.004)
Constant −0.112
(0.179)
0.045
(0.180)
0.132
(0.183)
−0.312
(0.300)
1.283***
(0.148)
−0.113
(0.241)
1.138***
v
Kleibergen-Paap LM 29.981 46.425
Kleibergen-Paap F 23.560 51.876
Anderson-Rubin F 2.164 2.055
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.083 0.092 0.087 0.091
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level.
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
Table C1 (Continued)
Table C2  Full regression table for plans to emigration within the next 12  months (inverse of WGI corruption 
control)
OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Corruptiona 0.039***
(0.010)
0.034***
(0.010)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.099***
(0.031)
0.064***
(0.022)
IV: accounts and 
value
−0.009*
(0.005)
−0.028***
(0.005)
IV: corruption 1950 0.158***
(0.024)
0.196***
(0.023)
Corruption  
perception
0.006***
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
0.043***
(0.004)
0.004**
(0.001)
0.041***
(0.004)
Disagree w/work 
hard,…
0.008***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.030***
(0.005)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.021***
(0.004)
GDP p.c. (log) −0.009*
(0.005)
−0.011**
(0.005)
−0.010**
(0.005)
−0.009*
(0.005)
−0.010
(0.015)
−0.010*
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.014)
GINI 0.032***
(0.010)
0.015
(0.010)
0.022**
(0.010)
0.017
(0.012)
0.081
(0.063)
0.019*
(0.011)
0.172**
(0.067)
Financial  
development
−0.015*
(0.008)
0.003
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.030*
(0.016)
−0.372***
(0.041)
0.017
(0.013)
−0.295***
(0.041)
Political stability 0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.004)
−0.057***
(0.013)
0.005
(0.003)
−0.063***
(0.013)
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OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Conflict (>25 BRD) −0.003
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.005)
−0.036
(0.024)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.050**
(0.025)
Human Freedom 
Index
0.015***
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.003)
0.011***
(0.003)
0.018***
(0.003)
−0.085***
(0.012)
0.014***
(0.003)
−0.091***
(0.011)
Female −0.006***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.000)
Age −0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Medium educ.  
(ref.: low)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
0.003
(0.004)
High education  
(ref.: low)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.012**
(0.005)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.006
(0.004)
Single 0.007***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.002)
−0.007*
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.003)
No children 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.002)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.002)
Urban location 0.007***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.001)
−0.012***
(0.004)
0.008***
(0.001)
−0.007*
(0.004)
2nd inc. quint.  
(ref.: poorest)
−0.002*
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
3rd inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
4th inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.002**
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
Richest inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.002)
Know someone 
abroad
0.030***
(0.002)
0.030***
(0.002)
0.029***
(0.002)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.030***
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.004)
Constant −0.031
(0.048)
0.012
(0.048)
0.021
(0.048)
−0.093
(0.062)
1.283***
(0.148)
−0.040
(0.051)
1.138***
(0.146)
Kleibergen-Paap LM 29.981 46.425
Kleibergen-Paap F 23.560 51.876
Anderson-Rubin F 5.789 5.408
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.024
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level.
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
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D Results using CPI corruption
Table D1 Full regression table for emigration desire (inverse of CPI corruption control)
OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Corruptiona 0.093*
(0.049)
0.097**
(0.047)
−0.005
(0.048)
0.338*
(0.173)
0.257**
(0.131)
IV: accounts and 
value
−0.008*
(0.005)
−0.020***
(0.004)
IV: corruption 1950 0.160***
(0.023)
0.187***
(0.023)
Corruption  
perception
0.060***
(0.004)
0.043***
(0.010)
0.043***
(0.004)
0.047***
(0.008)
0.042***
(0.004)
Disagree w/work 
hard,…
0.071***
(0.006)
0.063***
(0.007)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.065***
(0.006)
0.018***
(0.004)
GDP p.c. (log) −0.039***
(0.014)
−0.041***
(0.015)
−0.040***
(0.014)
−0.031*
(0.018)
−0.015
(0.015)
−0.033**
(0.017)
−0.010
(0.015)
GINI 0.201***
(0.057)
0.098*
(0.059)
0.158***
(0.058)
0.137**
(0.064)
0.080
(0.060)
0.142**
(0.061)
0.145**
(0.065)
Financial  
development
−0.167***
(0.044)
−0.096**
(0.043)
−0.112***
(0.042)
0.008
(0.070)
−0.341***
(0.039)
−0.020
(0.057)
−0.289***
(0.040)
Political stability −0.018
(0.016)
−0.014
(0.016)
−0.016
(0.015)
0.011
(0.021)
−0.058***
(0.013)
0.005
(0.017)
−0.063***
(0.014)
Conflict (>25 BRD) −0.068***
(0.026)
−0.071***
(0.026)
−0.073***
(0.025)
−0.053*
(0.031)
−0.047**
(0.023)
−0.058**
(0.029)
−0.057**
(0.024)
Human Freedom 
Index
0.074***
(0.012)
0.077***
(0.011)
0.062***
(0.011)
0.087***
(0.016)
−0.067***
(0.011)
0.082***
(0.015)
−0.071***
(0.011)
Female −0.029***
(0.003)
−0.031***
(0.003)
−0.031***
(0.003)
0.001**
(0.000)
−0.031***
(0.003)
0.001**
(0.000)
Age −0.004***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Medium educ.  
(ref.: low)
0.012**
(0.006)
0.010
(0.006)
0.009
(0.006)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.009
(0.006)
0.003
(0.004)
High education  
(ref.: low)
0.017***
(0.007)
0.017***
(0.007)
0.017***
(0.007)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.007
(0.004)
Single 0.040***
(0.005)
0.043***
(0.005)
0.044***
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.043***
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.003)
No children 0.001
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.006*
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.002)
−0.005
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.002)
Urban location 0.026***
(0.004)
0.026***
(0.004)
0.029***
(0.005)
−0.011**
(0.004)
0.028***
(0.004)
−0.007*
(0.004)
2nd inc. quint.  
(ref.: poorest)
−0.006
(0.003)
−0.005
(0.003)
−0.005
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.005
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
3rd inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.011***
(0.004)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.010***
(0.004)
−0.000
(0.001)
−0.010***
(0.004)
0.000
(0.001)
4th inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.015***
(0.004)
−0.012***
(0.004)
−0.012***
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.012***
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.001)
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OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Richest inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.020***
(0.005)
−0.016***
(0.005)
−0.015***
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.015***
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.002)
Know someone 
abroad
0.093***
(0.005)
0.095***
(0.005)
0.092***
(0.005)
0.003
(0.004)
0.093***
(0.005)
0.005
(0.004)
Constant −0.010
(0.175)
0.138
(0.175)
0.214
(0.174)
−0.273
(0.302)
1.192***
(0.142)
−0.158
(0.262)
1.091***
(0.150)
Kleibergen-Paap LM 30.816 35.904
Kleibergen-Paap F 25.340 36.128
Anderson-Rubin F 2.164 2.055
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.082 0.092 0.086 0.088
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level.
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
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Table D2  Full regression table for plans to emigration within the next 12  months (inverse of CPI corruption 
control)
OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Corruptiona 0.027**
(0.012)
0.024**
(0.011)
0.013
(0.011)
0.098***
(0.032)
0.077***
(0.026)
IV: accounts and 
value
−0.008*
(0.005)
−0.020***
(0.004)
IV: corruption 1950 0.160***
(0.023)
0.187***
(0.023)
Corruption  
perception
0.006***
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
0.043***
(0.004)
0.003*
(0.002)
0.042***
(0.004)
Disagree w/work 
hard,…
0.008***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.018***
(0.004)
GDP p.c. (log) −0.009*
(0.005)
−0.011**
(0.005)
−0.011**
(0.005)
−0.008
(0.006)
−0.015
(0.015)
−0.009
(0.005)
−0.010
(0.015)
GINI 0.032***
(0.010)
0.015
(0.010)
0.022**
(0.010)
0.017
(0.012)
0.080
(0.060)
0.018
(0.011)
0.145**
(0.065)
Financial  
development
−0.021***
(0.008)
−0.001
(0.008)
−0.003
(0.007)
0.027*
(0.016)
−0.341***
(0.039)
0.019
(0.014)
−0.289***
(0.040)
Political stability −0.000
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.004)
−0.058***
(0.013)
0.006*
(0.003)
−0.063***
(0.014)
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OLS IV: Accountsb IV: Value/GDPc
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Conflict (>25 BRD) −0.004
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.005
(0.004)
0.000
(0.005)
−0.047**
(0.023)
−0.001
(0.005)
−0.057**
(0.024)
Human Freedom 
Index
0.014***
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.016***
(0.003)
−0.067***
(0.011)
0.014***
(0.003)
−0.071***
(0.011)
Female −0.006***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.000)
−0.006***
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.000)
Age −0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Medium educ.  
(ref.: low)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
0.003
(0.004)
High education  
(ref.: low)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.007
(0.004)
Single 0.007***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.002)
−0.002
(0.003)
No children 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.002)
Urban location 0.007***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.001)
−0.011**
(0.004)
0.008***
(0.001)
−0.007*
(0.004)
2nd inc. quint.  
(ref.: poorest)
−0.002*
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
3rd inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
4th inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
Richest inc. quint. 
(poorest)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.002)
Know someone 
abroad
0.030***
(0.002)
0.031***
(0.002)
0.030***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.004)
0.030***
(0.002)
0.005
(0.004)
Constant −0.010
(0.052)
0.029
(0.051)
0.037
(0.052)
−0.083
(0.063)
1.192***
(0.142)
−0.054
(0.056)
1.091***
(0.150)
Kleibergen-Paap LM 30.816 35.904
Kleibergen-Paap F 25.340 36.128
Anderson-Rubin F 5.789 5.408
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.023 0.025 0.021 0.023
Observations 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381 282,381
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
aV-Dem Political corruption index.
bIV accounts: log no. of debit/credit/e-money accounts per capita.
cIV value: log monetary value of cashless payments relative to GDP.
Note: Robust SE in parentheses clustered at country-year level.
Source: V-Dem, World Bank, UN, UCDP, GWP, Cato, weighted data, own calculations.
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